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Abstract: 
 
We describe the evolution, over three phases, of Bronfenbrenner's theory from an ecological to a 
bioecological theory. Phase 1 (1973–1979) culminated in the publication of The Ecology of 
Human Development (1979). Phase 2 (1980–1993) saw almost immediate modifications to the 
theory, with more attention paid to the role of the individual and greater concern with 
developmental processes. In Phase 3 (1993–2006), proximal processes were defined and placed 
at the heart of bioecological theory, and from 1998, the Process‐Person‐Context‐Time (PPCT) 
model was described as the theory's appropriate research design. Given the extent of these 
changes, and to avoid theoretical incoherence, scholars should be cautious about stating that their 
research is based on Bronfenbrenner's theory without specifying which version they are using. 
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Article: 
 
Urie Bronfenbrenner's theory of human development underwent considerable changes from the 
time it was first proposed in the 1970s until Bronfenbrenner's death in 2005. It is therefore 
unfortunate that too many scholars treat the theory as though it deals solely with the influence of 
context on children's or adolescents' development and take no account of what came to be the 
central aspect of the theory, namely proximal processes, and how person characteristics, context, 
and historical time mutually influence those processes (see Tudge, Mokrova, Hatfield, & Karnik, 
2009). Moreover, although Bronfenbrenner described it as a theory of human development, from 
the start the developing individual was consistently viewed as influencing, and being influenced 
by, the environment. The family thus plays a key role: it does so as a microsystem context in 
which development occurs; it does so in terms of the personal characteristics of all individuals in 
the family; and most important, it does so in terms of the interactions among family members as 
part of proximal processes. 
 
It is also important to point out that although Bronfenbrenner may be best known as the 
developer of the theory that we describe in this article, he was also intensely interested in the 
family as an institution. During the years that he was developing his theory, he also wrote many 
papers on such topics as social‐class influences on child rearing, the effects of maternal 
employment on children's development, the problems associated with treating some families as 
being at a “deficit,” and family policies that are needed for families to grow healthily (for a 
review, see Tudge, 2013). Most relevant is the fact that there was cross‐fertilization between his 
more family‐oriented writings and those that have a more theoretical focus. 
 
The bioecological theory of human development, initially termed an ecological model or 
approach, was originally proposed by Bronfenbrenner to explain how human development 
occurs, focusing largely on the impact of context. Nonetheless, as denoted by his use of the 
word ecology, Bronfenbrenner clearly viewed development as emerging from the interaction of 
individual and context. Subsequent reformulations of his original ideas resulted as he came to 
stress the role played by the individual; the impact of time; and most important of all, proximal 
processes. 
 
Bioecological theory in its current or mature form specifies that researchers should study the 
settings in which a developing individual spends time and the relations with others in the same 
settings, the personal characteristics of the individual (and those with whom he or she typically 
interacts), both development over time and the historical time in which these individuals live, 
and the mechanisms that drive development (proximal processes). 
 
From a methodological point of view, bioecological theory privileges the study of proximal 
processes that are likely to lead to healthy development, with the developing individuals of 
interest being distinguished in at least one relevant individual characteristic and studied in more 
than a single context (almost always the typical settings in which the individuals are to be 
found). The theory was formulated, as Bronfenbrenner expressed it, to examine not “the forces 
that have shaped human development in the past, but . . . those that may already be operating 
today to influence what human beings may became tomorrow” (Bronfenbrenner & Evans, 2000, 
p. 117). 
 
Bronfenbrenner was a theorist who questioned his own propositions, and he himself drew 
attention to distinct phases in the development of his theory. These phases, however, are not 
quite the same as those that we have identified. Bronfenbrenner and Evans (2000) noted that the 
first theory‐related publications were published from 1970 to 1979, marking the first phase in the 
theory's evolution. Bronfenbrenner and Evans wrote that in this first phase the theory 
concentrated primarily on a description of the characteristics and influences of different contexts 
(microsystem, mesosystem, exosystem, and macrosystem). According to Bronfenbrenner and 
Evans, the following two phases each began with publications in the major handbooks of the day 
(Bronfenbrenner & Crouter, 1983; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998). 
 
Our dating of the phases is necessarily somewhat imprecise, as we rely on date of publication 
rather than the date of writing and submission for publication. We have, for example, identified 
1993 as both ending the second phase and starting the third phase. It is quite clear, however, that 
whereas the ideas in Bronfenbrenner's 1993 chapter fit with those expressed in his other 
publications from 1980 onwards, his coauthored paper of the same date (Bronfenbrenner & 
Ceci, 1993) marked a dramatic shift in thinking. 
 
Regardless of the precise timing of these phases, what is absolutely clear is that the theory 
underwent significant changes between its inception and its final state. Unfortunately, as Tudge 
et al. (2009) pointed out, this fact has been ignored by many scholars. Tudge et al. analyzed 25 
studies published between 2001 and 2008 (i.e., well after the beginning of the final stage in the 
theory's development), whose authors stated that their research was based on Bronfenbrenner's 
theory. Of those, only four were based on the most recent form of the theory, and most described 
the theory simply as one of contextual influences on development, completely ignoring the 
centerpiece of the theory in its final incarnation: proximal processes. As Tudge et al. argued, 
there is nothing wrong with deliberately basing one's research on an earlier version of the theory 
or even on a subset of its key concepts; however, for theoretical confusion to be avoided, one 
should be explicit about the specific theoretical basis for the study. Equally important, scholars 
should pay greater attention to the fact that while theorists are still alive and publishing, their 
theories are likely to develop. 
 
We believe that for our field to develop, research should be theoretically driven, with studies 
explicitly designed to test theory, calling into question its major concepts, supporting them, or 
expanding on them. But this can occur only if scholars base their work on an accurate reading of 
the theory as it currently exists or if they have explicitly tried to test an earlier version of the 
theory. Supporting or attacking a reduced, old, or simply incorrect version of the theory is neither 
helpful nor appropriate. Therefore, our goal here is to describe the three phases in the 
development of Bronfenbrenner's theory as it matured into its final form, analyzing the principle 
characteristics and reformulations of each phase. To attain this goal, we first identified all the 
published papers by Bronfenbrenner or with Bronfenbrenner as a first author that were related to 
the construction of his theory of human development. We were considerably aided in this task by 
the bibliographic chapter published by Lüscher and Jones (1995), which provides a fairly 
complete and accurate listing of all his scholarly work published until 1994. To avoid continual 
repetition of Bronfenbrenner's name, we cite his single‐authored papers here by publication date 
only. 
 
Phase 1 (1973–1979) 
 
In Phase 1, Bronfenbrenner named his emerging theory either an ecological approach to human 
development (1974, 1975, 1977a) or an ecological model of human development (1976, 1978, 
1979b), referring to it on occasion as a science (1977c) or a theoretical perspective (1979b). 
Interestingly, the roots of the theory can be seen as far back as a chapter published in the 1960s, 
in which Bronfenbrenner (1961) showed that adolescents' responsibility and leadership varied 
according to the parent–adolescent relationship, child gender, and the family's social‐class 
background. Bronfenbrenner's publications during this period were characterized by analysis and 
discussion of relevant research conducted by others in psychology and human development, 
most of which he used to demonstrate their methodological limitations. 
 
Motives and Influences 
 
Bronfenbrenner's main motive for starting this endeavor was based on two primary pillars: the 
limitations of much contemporary research in psychology, in particular studies conducted in 
laboratory settings (1973, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977c, 1979a, 1979b), and the demands of 
politicians interested in social policies relevant to children, adolescents, and their families (1973, 
1974, 1975, 1977a, 1979a, 1979b). He critiqued the artificial and limited ways in which research 
was conducted as being inadequate for the study of processes of development that occur in the 
settings that are most familiar to children (e.g., home, school, neighborhood) and with people 
with whom those children either live or are familiar (1973, 1977c, 1979b). Lab‐based research, 
by contrast, is typically conducted in an unfamiliar setting by a researcher unknown to the child 
(1973, 1977a), something that Bronfenbrenner argued calls into question the validity of the 
results (1973, 1979b). Even when research was conducted in the settings in which children are 
situated, Bronfenbrenner noted that the researchers' focus was far more on the organism (the 
person) than on the setting (1975, 1977a, 1979b), the latter being described in terms of a static 
environment unrelated to any system of values (1976). Bronfenbrenner stressed the necessity to 
take into account more than two persons (the researcher and the subject) in the setting in which 
the child is situated and to focus on the developmental processes involved in attaining any 
developmental outcomes (1973, 1974, 1976, 1977a, 1977c, 1978, 1979a, 1979b). Finally, 
Bronfenbrenner argued that the absence of appropriate research was due to the lack of a theory 
that took seriously the contexts in which human beings live (1979a). 
 
These research limitations meant that Bronfenbrenner was unable to find answers to the many 
questions asked by those with responsibility for social policies—questions primarily related to 
practical questions about the lives of children and their families (1974, 1977a). Bronfenbrenner 
argued that research should be informed by social policy, the opposite of what scholars typically 
think, which is that research should guide social policy (1974, 1975, 1977a, 1979b), and that 
researchers needed a better understanding of the implications of the profound changes in family 
configurations and relations that were occurring during the 1960s and 1970s in the United States 
(1975, 1976, 1979b). His analyses of these social changes and the negative impacts they had on 
the psychological development of children, adolescents, and their parents illustrated the 
importance of social class and race (1973, 1975, 1977a). His concern with these issues led 
Bronfenbrenner to conclude that “further advance in the scientific understanding of the basic 
intrapsychic and interpersonal processes of human development requires their investigation in 
[the] actual environment, both immediate and remote, in which the human beings live” (1979b, 
p. 12). 
 
A number of scholars greatly influenced Bronfenbrenner's thinking during this first phase of the 
development of his theory. One was Kurt Lewin and his notion of the phenomenological field, 
expressed topologically, that constituted the person's ecological environment (1976, 1977b, 
1977c, 1978, 1979b). Other important influences included the Soviet psychologists Luria, 
Leontiev, and Vygotsky and their idea of research that leads to social transformation (1977a, 
1977c, 1978, 1979b); Bronfenbrenner's initial mentor, Dearborn, who noted that one had to 
change something to understand it and discussed the importance of operationalizing research in 
context (1975, 1976, 1977a, 1977c, 1978); and the sociologists Thomas and Thomas, who held 
that it is not only the objective aspects of an environment that have a developmental effect, using 
the celebrated phrase: “Situations perceived as real are real in their consequences,” cited several 
times by Bronfenbrenner during this period (1976, p. 170; 1977c, p. 529; 1979b, p. 127). 
 
Concepts and Definitions 
 
What did Bronfenbrenner mean by the ecology of human development? This key concept, 
according to Bronfenbrenner (1977a), was first used in the realm of human development by 
Barker and Wright (1954) but had little effect in demonstrating “how environments change, and 
the implications of this change for the human beings who live and grow in these environments” 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1975, p. 439). Thus, Bronfenbrenner (1979b) argued, contemporary studies of 
human development were studies out‐of‐context rather than ecological studies that should 
examine the interrelations between the developing person and the changing micro and macro 
context (1977a). As he pointed out, “Ecology implies an adjustment between organism and 
environment” (1975, p. 439). Or, as he wrote in a more complete definition: 
 
The ecology of human development involves the scientific study of the progressive, 
mutual accommodation between an active, growing human being and the changing 
properties of the immediate settings in which the developing person lives, as this process 
is affected by relations between these settings, and by the larger contexts within which 
the settings are embedded. (1979b, p. 21) 
 
Bronfenbrenner conceived of the environment topologically as an arrangement of four 
interconnected structures, with those closer to the developing individual being enclosed within 
those further afield (1976, 1977b, 1977c, 1978, 1979b). He adapted Brim's (1975) terminology 
of microstructure, mesostructure, and macrostructure and provided the following 
names: microsystem, mesosystem, exosystem, and macrosystem. However, given that 
Bronfenbrenner viewed the environment as intrinsically connected to the individuals within it, he 
often used the qualifier ecological when referring to the environment. His focus, in other words, 
was not simply on the environment, or context, but on the ecological system that included the 
developing individual (1976). 
 
Bronfenbrenner defined the microsystem as the most proximal setting, with particular physical 
characteristics, in which a person is situated, such as the home, child care, playground, and place 
of work, and in which the developing person can interact in a face‐to‐face way with others (1974, 
1979b). The setting is one in which activities and interpersonal roles and relations engaged in 
over time are the constitutive elements (1976, 1977c, 1978, 1979b). 
 
He defined the mesosystem as the relations among two or more microsystems in which the 
developing person actively participates (1977c, 1978, 1979b). In other words, “the mesosystem 
is a system of microsystems” (1976, p. 163; 1977b, p. 46; 1978, p. 6; 1979b, p. 25). It is formed, 
or widened, each time an individual enters a new setting (1979b), and it is diminished when the 
opposite happens. The developmental characteristics of the mesosystem are similar to those of 
the microsystem, the main difference being that rather than the activities and interpersonal roles 
and relations occurring within a single microsystem, they occur across settings (1979b). Given 
the contemporary propensity to study development in a single context, Bronfenbrenner presented 
a large number of testable hypotheses related to the ways in which the mesosystem might 
influence human development, as a way to encourage scholars to study development across 
settings (1979b). 
 
Bronfenbrenner defined the exosystem as the “third circle of the ecological model” (1977c, p. 
526), being an ecological setting in which the developing person of interest is not situated, and 
thus does not participate actively within it, but nonetheless experiences its influence (1977b, 
1979b), and at times can also influence it (1979b), whether formally or informally (1976, 1977c, 
1978). This effect is indirect, such as when what occurs in a parent's workplace has a follow‐on 
effect within the home (assuming that the child is the developing person of interest) (1974, 
1978). The exosystem has an important role in this first phase of the theory because politicians 
develop a given society's social policies within it. Bronfenbrenner (1974) had in mind programs 
such as those that facilitate young children's attending a child‐care center and policy decisions 
about the type of care and education that children receive there. 
 
The macrosystem differs fundamentally from the other levels of context, embracing the 
institutional systems of a culture or subculture, such as the economic, social, education, legal, 
and political systems (1976, 1978). Bronfenbrenner stated that the influence of the macrosystem 
on the other ecological settings is reflected in how the lower systems (e.g., family, school) 
function (1977b). The hallmark of the macrosystem is its overarching belief system or ideology 
(1979b). As a result, the daily experiences of children in any given societal, socioeconomic, 
ethnic, or religious group tend to be similar (1977b, 1979b). Macrosystem studies are those that 
compare systems with different basic patterns of social organization or those that deal with 
changes that fundamentally alter the characteristics of a given society (1977c). 
 
During this phase Bronfenbrenner paid particular attention to the normative changes in roles and 
environments that occur in people's lives, terming this phenomenon an ecological 
transition (1976, 1977b, 1977c, 1978, 1979b). An ecological transition is a typical example of a 
mutual accommodation between an organism and its setting—in other words, the essence of 
what he conceptualized as the ecology of human development. In several of his papers, 
Bronfenbrenner placed the phenomenon at the level of the mesosystem (1977c, 1978), such as 
when a child goes from home to a child‐care center or a young adult leaves school for the world 
of work. However, taking a broader perspective, he stated that it could occur in any of the four 
levels of the ecological environment across the entire life course (1979b). Thus, an ecological 
transition can occur given biological changes related to physical maturation or how individuals 
deal with those changes (1976, 1977c, 1978, 1979b), changes in the environment (1977b, 1977c, 
1978, 1979b), or a combination of these factors (1979b). Its occurrence can be either a 
consequence or a motive for a developmental process (1979b) and exerts its impact not only on 
the developing person but also on the system of which that individual is a part, such as the 
family, a group of friends, and colleagues at work (1977c, 1978). 
 
The operationalization of an ecological‐transition study requires a “pre–post” design (1977b, 
1977c, 1978, 1979b) with real situations and in natural settings (1978, 1979b), involving the 
same person in different activities and roles and almost always in more than one ecological 
environment (1978). Bronfenbrenner pointed out three essential characteristics of ecological 
environments. First, they must be understood systemically or interdependently (1977c, 1978). 
Thus, what happens or fails to happen in any given environment depends to a large extent on 
events and relationships in other related environments (1976). The consequences for ecological 
research is that researchers must consider the interaction of systems in which people participate, 
not only the influence of (and their influence on) the immediate setting in which the developing 
individuals of interest are situated (1976, 1977b, 1977c, 1978). 
 
Second, in ecological environments development occurs via processes, understood as modes of 
interaction among people (1973, 1977c), maintained in the course of reciprocal relations between 
them and with their environment (1973, 1976, 1977a, 1977b, 1977c, 1978). Bronfenbrenner 
therefore argued that researchers conducting ecological research must consider more than one 
person in the setting, including the researcher's own influence on the subject (1977a, 1977c, 
1978). He termed second‐order effects the effective participation of a third person (N + 2) in a 
developing person's life (1974, 1976, 1977a, 1977c, 1978, 1979a, 1979b), and third‐order 
effects (1976) or higher‐order effects (1976, 1978) those situations in which more people are 
involved. 
 
Third, ecological environments are constituted in a phenomenological field that orients the 
developing person's actions and interactions (1976, 1978). The environment should thus be 
considered as it is perceived and understood by the person, meaning that it is partly constituted 
of the world of imagination, fantasy, and unreality (1977b). From a methodological perspective, 
a phenomenological analysis is the analysis of how each participant perceives the setting and the 
various elements contained within it (1976, 1977a, 1977c). 
 
Bronfenbrenner stressed that human development involves both continuity and change. There is 
a progressive change in the person's characteristics over time and space (1975, 1978, 1979b), 
which signifies continuity both in the person and in the environment (1975), as well as changes 
by virtue of the dynamic relations among the person, the environment, and the other people 
within that environment, all engaged in reciprocal activities that (in other words, foreshadowing 
proximal processes) become progressively more complex (1973, 1977a, 1979a) in an enduring 
pattern of activities (1973, 1975, 1979a). “The growing person acquires a more extended, 
differentiated, and valid conception of the ecological environment, and becomes motivated and 
able to engage in activities that reveal the properties of, sustain, or restructure that environment 
at levels of similar or greater complexity in form and content” (1979b, p. 27). The child's 
development will be more successful if the relationships established in ecological environments 
are with people with whom the child has established a positive emotional attachment that is both 
mutual and permanent (1973, 1979a), if those environments provide the opportunity for the 
observing of and engaging in activities with the assistance of people who have better 
understanding and skill, and if they encourage the performance of skills acquired with help in 
other settings and in other relationships (1979a). 
 
Phase 2 (1980–1993) 
 
Motives and Influences 
 
Bronfenbrenner's main goal in this period was to show the ways in which the environment was 
conceptualized, either theoretically or empirically, in contemporary research in human 
development and deal with a lacuna identified in his Phase 1 writings—the lack of any 
explanation of the role played by person characteristics in the course of development. These 
objectives were attained in various papers (1983, 1986a, 1986b, 1988, 1989; Bronfenbrenner & 
Crouter, 1983) in which he not only identified the different paradigms existing in the literature 
but also presented his own, ecological, paradigm (1993). As Bronfenbrenner himself affirmed, 
“from the scientist's perspective, perhaps the most important function of a review of existing 
knowledge in a particular area is to identify promising directions for future investigation” 
(1986a, p. 734). 
 
However, he also identified a need to reassess, extend, and even renounce (1989) some aspects 
of what he had written in his 1979 volume. Specifically, in addition to paying greater attention to 
the role played by the individual in his or her own development, he attended more to processes of 
development and focused explicit attention on the passage of time. He also revised his concepts 
of development and of ecological environments (particularly the microsystem and macrosystem) 
and formulated a new research paradigm for the study of human development—a model first 
termed the Person‐Process‐Context model (1986a, 1986b; Bronfenbrenner & Crouter, 1983) and 
then the Process‐Person‐Context model (1988, 1989). This model would be revised and 
broadened in the next and final phase of the theory's development. 
 
Among the authors who influenced Bronfenbrenner during this phase, several names stand out 
including several who had been influential in his Phase 1 thinking: Kurt Lewin, who was no 
longer cited for his topological notions of the environment but who provided the basic 
conceptualization from which came Bronfenbrenner's new definition of human development 
(1988, 1989, 1993); Lev Vygotsky and Alexander Luria, who strengthened Bronfenbrenner's 
perception of human development as a process varying as a function of the cultural context in 
which people are situated (1983, 1989, 1993); Glen Elder, who illustrated the chronosystem in 
his research; Cecil Mary Drillien, a doctor and professor of children's health and welfare, who 
provided data that proved highly relevant for the Process‐Person‐Context model (1989); and 
Anne Crouter, who coauthored the influential 1983 Handbook chapter. 
 
Concepts and Definitions 
 
Several of Bronfenbrenner's papers during Phase 2 focused on the different types of research 
models that had been used in contemporary studies of human development. He and Crouter 
defined a research model as “the conceptualization of the environment, and its role in 
development, that is explicit in the operational definitions employed by the investigator” 
(Bronfenbrenner & Crouter, 1983, p. 359). Bronfenbrenner used this conceptualization as he 
sought to trace the evolution of such models used in research in this area. 
 
Social‐address models are those that are based on the geographic or social locale in which people 
live. “The design involves nothing more than comparison of the psychological characteristics of 
children or adults living in different social environments (e.g., class, nationality, family structure, 
etc.)” (1986b, p. 289). The model's main limitation is that human development is treated as 
though it were solely dependent on environmental factors (1989), and it reveals neither the 
processes by which the environment influences the developing individual nor the person 
characteristics implicated in that process (1983, 1986a, 1988; Bronfenbrenner & Crouter, 1983). 
As a result, Bronfenbrenner argued, studies using this model do not provide any data capable of 
guiding future interventions on structure or process that could affect the course of development 
(1986a, 1986b). Moreover, proponents of this model assume that all individuals living in the 
same environment are equally affected by it, regardless of their biological or psychological 
characteristics (1988). 
 
Person‐context models move beyond social‐address models in that they include participants' 
person characteristics (e.g., sex, biological condition) of the different groups under consideration. 
This allows a variety of combinations of person characteristics and contexts in the analysis of 
development (1988, 1989). However, this model still is limited in its ability to describe 
development because it is unable to explain the process by which it occurs (1988). 
 
Process‐context models allow the evaluation of the influence of some external setting on a 
specific developmental feature, such as the impact of parents' workplace experiences on the 
dynamics and functioning of the family (1986a). In this model, the processes that translate the 
contextual experiences into development are explicated, including not only the objective 
behaviors occurring in any given interaction but also the relevant subjective psychological states, 
such as beliefs and opinions of the interacting individuals (1988). 
 
Person‐process‐context models are those in which the developmental outcomes are viewed as 
stemming from interactions of the person and the context (1986b, 1988; Bronfenbrenner & 
Crouter, 1983), thereby emphasizing the process whereby the developmental outcome was 
attained (1989). Bronfenbrenner cited Drillien's research with premature and full‐term babies as 
one example of evidence of the interaction between biological and environmental forces acting 
in conjunction and leading the person (the baby) to developmentally appropriate outcomes. In 
this model “the term synergism is used to describe a phenomena … in which the joint operation 
of two or more forces produces an effect that is greater than the sum of the individual effects” 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1989, p. 199). 
 
Despite the major advance of this model in comparison to the others, Bronfenbrenner alerted 
readers to its limitations, referring specifically to the fact that scholars did not refer to 
characteristics of all of the individuals involved in any given interaction (1986a). For example, 
Bronfenbrenner (1989) examined the ways in which Drillien's study was conducted to assess the 
developmental outcomes relating to mothers' interactions with their babies. In this study, the 
outcomes were analyzed taking into account the interactions and processes mediated by maternal 
responsiveness to their baby's solicitations as a function of both the environment (family 
socioeconomic status and neighborhood) and person characteristics (the baby's birth weight). 
However, the responsiveness of the babies toward their mothers was not considered. In other 
words, the relation was examined only in a unidirectional, not bidirectional, fashion. 
 
Another problem that was generally noted in this and the other models was the absence of any 
consideration of time as an important component of the research. This meant, Bronfenbrenner 
argued, that researchers generally did not take into account development as a process of 
continuity and change (1988). Those who did take it into account were using, he suggested, a 
chronosystem model. 
 
Chronosystem models are those in which time is treated as being as important as the 
environment for human development (1986a, 1986b, 1988, 1989). Researchers using this model 
take into account changes that occur over the individual's lifetime caused by events or 
experiences (1989). These experiences may stem from the external environment (e.g., a sibling's 
birth, going to school, parents separating) or within the developing individual's own organism 
(e.g., entering puberty, becoming ill) (1988, 1989). Such changes can either be normative, when 
the change is expected, such as school entry, or nonnormative, when the occurrence is 
unexpected, such as the sudden death or serious illness of a family member (1986b, 1988). The 
main characteristic of these experiences or events is that “they alter the existing relation between 
person and environment, thus creating a dynamic that may instigate developmental change” 
(Bronfenbrenner, 1989, p. 201). Bronfenbrenner (1989) stressed that research using this model 
should accompany the developing individuals of choice before and after the events assumed to 
influence development have happened. One study that Bronfenbrenner often discussed to 
exemplify this model was Elder's research about the impact of the Great Depression on the lives 
of American children, adolescents, and adults (1986b, 1989, 1993). 
 
The ecological paradigm. At the end of his discussion of the various paradigms found in 
contemporary research on human development, Bronfenbrenner (1993) presented the ecological 
paradigm as that in which development is viewed as a function that involves interactions over 
time between a person and those individuals with whom he or she has face‐to‐face interactions in 
the immediate settings in which the person is situated. He then described the characteristics that 
should be part of any ecological study, including those both of the individuals concerned and of 
the environments. He paid particular attention to what he referred to as a person's “instigative 
characteristics,” namely those that invited or discouraged reactions from the environment, either 
promoting or disrupting psychological growth (e.g., calm or fussy babies) and qualities that 
involve an active orientation or interaction with the environment, such as a child's initiative to 
initiate or maintain reciprocal interactions with parents or other caregivers (1989, 1993). “Both 
types of developmentally instigative characteristics, when manifested over time in particular 
settings, tend to evoke complementary patterns of continuing environmental feedback, thus 
creating progressively more complex developmental trajectories that exhibit continuity through 
time” (1989, p. 219). In the subsequent, and final, phase of the theory's development, 
Bronfenbrenner would describe in more detail these person characteristics and their active 
influence on developmental processes. 
 
In similar fashion, Bronfenbrenner noted instigative characteristics of the environment—those 
that could serve in a constructive or destructive way. In the first case are objects and places that 
invite manipulation and exploration and thus promote developmental processes; in the second are 
those environments characterized by instability, unpredictability, and the absence of any clear 
structure, characteristics that are prejudicial to development (1993). 
 
During this phase, some changes were also introduced in the concepts of the microsystem and 
macrosystem, in particular the emphasis given to the processes that occur in each of these 
contexts. At the microsystem level Bronfenbrenner stressed the psychological characteristics of 
all the individuals present in the immediate setting in which interpersonal interactions occur. The 
microsystem was thus defined as a pattern of interpersonal relations experienced face‐to‐face in a 
given environment “containing other persons with distinctive characteristics of temperament, 
personality, and systems of belief” (1989, p. 227). These relations, which influence the 
distinctive patterns of psychological functioning, are altered as a function of the setting in which 
the developing person is situated (1993). 
 
To understand the influence of culture, developed over historical time, on developing 
individuals, Bronfenbrenner relied, in part, on Vygotsky's and Luria's ideas. He thus redefined 
the concept of the macrosystem as “the overarching pattern of micro‐, meso‐, and exosystems 
characteristic of a given culture, subculture, or other extended social structure” (1993, p. 25). 
This extended structure refers to a pattern of “similar belief system, social and economic 
resources, hazards, life‐styles, etc. [such as] social classes, ethnic or religious groups” (1989, p. 
229). He continued as follows: 
 
To the extent that it is practically possible, every study of development in context should 
include a contrast between at least two macrosystems. In terms of research design, this 
means that, whatever questions or hypotheses are under investigation, the analysis is 
conducted separately for each macro‐domain, thus making it possible to determine the 
extent to which the hypothesized processes operate in the same way in different 
macrosystems. (1989, p. 231) 
 
His 1993 paper included the same requirement, but he did not mention it in any of his subsequent 
Phase 3 publications. 
 
Revising his earlier notion of the individual, Bronfenbrenner (1993) emphasized the nature of the 
person as a “highly complex biopsychological organism—characterized by a distinctive complex 
of evolving interrelated, dynamic capacities for thought, feeling, and action” (p. 7), from which 
one can deduce his concern to make more explicit the participation of the person in his or her 
own development. Continuing to cite Vygotsky and Luria, Bronfenbrenner emphasized the 
interaction of biological factors and the contexts in which people develop: 
 
It is true that individuals can and often do modify, select, reconstruct, and even create 
their environments. But this capacity emerges only to the extent that the person has been 
enabled to engage in self‐directed action as a joint function not only of his biological 
endowment but also of the environment in which he or she developed. There is not one 
without the other. (1989, pp. 223–224) 
 
Bronfenbrenner, in this second phase, thus started to deal explicitly with the lacuna many 
identified in his writings up to and including 1979—the absence of a clear presentation of 
characteristics of the person and how they contribute to developmental processes. However, the 
challenge of constructing a framework for considering person characteristics, similar to that of 
context, was met only in the third and final phase of his writings. 
 
Phase 3 (1993–2006) 
 
Motives and Influences 
 
The primary objective of this phase of the development of the theory was to show how individual 
characteristics, in conjunction with aspects of the context, both spatial and temporal, influence 
what Bronfenbrenner now called proximal processes—the “engines of development” 
(Bronfenbrenner & Evans, 2000, p. 118). In this final version of his theory, named both the 
bioecological theory and the bioecological model of human development, Bronfenbrenner gave 
pride of place to proximal processes (1994, 1995b, 1999, 2000, 2001; Bronfenbrenner & 
Ceci, 1993, 1994; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, 2006) and included the Process‐Person‐
Context‐Time (PPCT) model of how to conduct bioecological research (1995b, 1999, 2000, 
2001; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, 2006). 
 
To show how the PPCT model operated, Bronfenbrenner relied heavily on others' research—
from Drillien's work published in the 1960s through Elder's study of the Great Depression to 
Steinberg and colleagues' research into the effects of different parenting practices on adolescent 
outcomes. The results, and even more evidently the methods, of Drillien's research provided 
clear support for Bronfenbrenner's position that proximal processes were the most powerful 
predictor of human development (1994, 1999, 2000; Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1993, 1994; 
Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, 2006). Elder's research also contributed greatly, as it showed 
the clear impact of historical time on development (1994, 1999, 2001; Bronfenbrenner & 
Ceci, 1994; Bronfenbrenner & Evans, 2000; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, 2006). However, it 
is also worth noting that Lewin's influence can still be seen in Bronfenbrenner's view that 
ecological environments should be understood as involving the phenomenological field of a 
developing person, formed by a set of nested structures (1994, 1995a). During this phase, 
Bronfenbrenner continued his development of a theory that could lead, via public policy, to 
improving the living conditions for children, adolescents, and their families by optimizing 
developmental outcomes (1994, 1995b, 2000, 2001; Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1994; 
Bronfenbrenner & Evans, 2000; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, 2006). 
 
Definitions and Concepts 
 
If in the first phase it was necessary to explain Bronfenbrenner's conception of an ecology of 
human development, in this third and final phase it is necessary to describe what he meant by the 
bioecology of human development. Bronfenbrenner defined the bioecological model as “an 
evolving theoretical system for the scientific study of human development over time” (2001, pp. 
6963–6964; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006, p. 793). This system presupposes that the four 
elements of which it is formed (process, person, context, time) simultaneously influence human 
beings' developmental outcomes; their effects are not merely additive (1999). 
 
Proximal processes. Describing the change from an ecological to a bioecological model, 
Bronfenbrenner emphasized the role played by the person in his or her own development by 
means of a mechanism termed proximal processes. Proximal processes are the center of 
bioecological theory and are viewed as the driving forces of human development (1999, 2000, 
2001; Bronfenbrenner & Evans, 2000; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, 2006). Two 
propositions, provided in each of his publications during this phase, lay out the properties of 
proximal processes and the manner in which they operate: 
 
Proposition 1 states that, especially in its early phases, and to a great extent throughout 
the life course, human development takes place through processes of progressively more 
complex reciprocal interaction between an active evolving biopsychological human 
organism and the persons, objects, and symbols in its immediate environment. To be 
effective, the interaction must occur on a fairly regular basis over extended periods of 
time. Such enduring forms of interaction in the immediate environment are referred to 
henceforth as proximal processes. . . . Proposition 2 [states that] the form, power, content, 
and direction of the proximal processes that affect development vary systematically as a 
joint function of the characteristics of the developing person and the environment (both 
immediate and more remote) in which the processes are taking place and the nature of the 
developmental outcomes under consideration. (Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1993, p. 317) 
 
Almost identical wording, with the addition of phrasing that included time from 1995 onward, 
can be found in any of his most recent papers (1994, p. 1644; 1995b, pp. 620–621; 1999, p. 5; 
2000, p. 130; 2001, pp. 6964–6965; Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1994, p. 572; Bronfenbrenner & 
Evans, 2000, pp. 117–118; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, p. 996; 2006, pp. 797–798). 
 
The analyses conducted by Bronfenbrenner regarding proximal process indicated that he 
considered them as almost always acting in a positive way on developmental outcomes, whether 
by promoting outcomes of competence or by diminishing the possibility of dysfunctional 
outcomes (1994; Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1993, 1994; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, 2006). 
The first, and probably unique, consideration of the possibility that proximal processes could 
promote dysfunctional outcomes can be found in his paper coauthored with Evans (2000). 
Drawing on Bronfenbrenner and Morris (1998), Bronfenbrenner and Evans defined competence 
as the “demonstrated acquisition and further development of knowledge, skill, or ability to 
conduct and direct one's own behavior across situations and developmental domains” (p. 118). 
They defined dysfunction as “the recurrent manifestation of difficulties in maintaining control 
and integration of behavior across situations and different domains of development” (p. 118). 
Bronfenbrenner and Evans then went on to ask the crucial question, although they left the answer 
unstated: “If proximal processes are indeed the ‘engines of development,’ what are the 
differences between those that produce dysfunction vs. competence?” (p. 118). 
 
An important function of proximal processes is their potential to transform genotypic 
characteristics into phenotypes, actualizing genetic potential and thus improving “effective 
developmental functioning” (Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1994). To explain this, the coauthors 
discussed three hypotheses, namely: (a) “heritability (h2) will be higher when proximal processes 
are strong and lower when such processes are weak” (p. 572); (b) “proximal processes actualize 
genetic potentials both for enhancing functional competence and for reducing degrees of 
dysfunction” (p. 578); and (c) “the power of proximal processes to actualize genetic potentials 
for developmental competence . . . will be greater in advantaged and stable environments than in 
those that are disadvantaged and disorganized” (p. 578). 
 
On the basis of many nontheoretical papers that he wrote, discussing others' research into the 
conditions under which children and families would thrive, Bronfenbrenner concluded that 
proximal processes would have greater chance of promoting outcomes of developmental 
competence in more stable and advantageous environments. By contrast, in settings that are 
unstable and disadvantageous, proximal processes would function by avoiding or slowing 
outcomes of developmental dysfunction (1994, 2000, 2001; Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1994; 
Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, 2006). These hypotheses are clearly related to the conviction 
that public policy, if planned on the basis of bioecological theory, could improve the ecological 
environments in which human beings live and thus lead to developmental outcomes of 
competence (1999; Bronfenbrenner & Ceci, 1994). He also argued that the developmental power 
of proximal processes would also be increased if they occurred among people who developed a 
strong emotional relationship (2000, 2001; Bronfenbrenner & Evans, 2000; Bronfenbrenner & 
Morris, 1998, 2006). 
 
Proximal processes involve not only relationships among people but also relations between 
people and the objects and symbols with which they come into contact; however, 
Bronfenbrenner paid little attention to relations with objects and symbols, with the exception of a 
single page in his chapters published with Morris (1998, 2006) and a paragraph in his 1999 
chapter. When engaging in solo activities, only with objects and/or symbols, a person's “own 
disposition and resources would play a far stronger role in affecting the direction and power of 
the proximal process than in the case of interpersonal interaction” (Bronfenbrenner & 
Morris, 2006, p. 814), just as characteristics of the setting also become more relevant 
(Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, 2006). 
 
Person characteristics. Bronfenbrenner described three types of person characteristics as part of 
the second P of PPCT. The characteristic of force (or “disposition”; 1995b) is considered the 
most likely to influence a person's developmental outcomes, whether in a generative or 
disruptive manner. Generative force characteristics are those that initiate or sustain proximal 
processes, whereas those that are disruptive can impede or interrupt them (Bronfenbrenner & 
Morris, 1998, 2006). Generative force characteristics “involve such active orientations as 
curiosity, tendency to initiate and engage in activity alone or with others, responsiveness to 
initiatives by others, and readiness to defer immediate gratification to pursue long‐term goals” 
(Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, p. 1009; 2006, p. 810). By contrast, individuals with disruptive 
force characteristics tend toward “impulsiveness, explosiveness, distractibility, inability to defer 
gratification, or, in a more extreme form, [readily] resort to aggression and violence” 
(Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, p. 1009; 2006, p. 810). 
 
Resource characteristics are those that influence a person's ability to engage effectively in 
proximal processes (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, 2006). Those that activate development 
include “ability, knowledge, skill, and experience,” whereas resources that limit or disrupt 
proximal processes “include genetic defects, low birthweight, physical handicaps, severe and 
persistent illness, or damage to brain function” (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006, p. 812). 
 
Demand characteristics are those easily noted qualities of the developing person that can invite 
or discourage reactions from the social environment, influencing the way in which proximal 
processes are established. Bronfenbrenner and Morris (2006) provided examples of demand 
characteristics as an agitated or calm temperament, attractive versus unattractive appearance, and 
hyperactivity and passivity. They also mentioned other characteristics that could be immediately 
seen, such as age, gender, and skin color, all of which can affect the establishment of proximal 
processes. 
 
Finally, emphasizing the role of person characteristics in his new bioecological model, 
Bronfenbrenner highlighted the fact that they appear twice in this new conceptualization of 
human development. They first appear as one of the components of the model and therefore as 
an influence on development and, at the same time, as a developmental outcome (1995a, 1995b, 
2000; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, 2006). 
 
Context. Context, about which so much was written in earlier phases of the theory, received 
much less attention in this third and final phase. Without further modifications to those that had 
been developed in the first two phases, Bronfenbrenner (1994, 1999) restricted himself to 
providing definitions of the four “systems” of context. Bronfenbrenner and Morris (1998, 2006) 
made clear that proximal processes, whether involving solitary interaction with objects or 
symbols or interaction with one or more other social partners, occur within microsystems, but 
that the other systems of context are also influential. However, it is particularly striking that the 
macrosystem, to which particular attention had been paid in 1979, 1989, and 1993, is only briefly 
discussed once (1994) in this entire phase. Bronfenbrenner and Morris (1998, 2006) discussed 
Steinberg, Darling, and Fletcher's (1995) research on adolescents from groups that are 
distinguished by ethnicity (which had been considered “subcultural” aspects of the macrosystem 
in the previous phase) as though it were related to the mesosystem and exosystem rather than to 
the macrosystem. 
 
Time. Finally, time is included in the model, building on what Bronfenbrenner had earlier 
termed the chronosystem (1988). In the bioecological model, however, the concept of time was 
broadened to include what happens over the course of both ontogenetic and historical time. 
Inspired by Elder's (1974) research, Bronfenbrenner stated, “The individual's own developmental 
life course is seen as embedded in and powerfully shaped by conditions and events occurring 
during the historical period through which the person lives” (1995b, p. 641; 1999, p. 20). 
 
In his publications of 1998 and 2006, in collaboration with Morris, Bronfenbrenner called further 
attention to the importance of time, in different senses. They described it as having three levels: 
microtime, mesotime, and macrotime. Microtime refers to “continuity versus discontinuity in 
ongoing episodes of proximal process,” mesotime has to do with how often these episodes occur 
over days and weeks, and macrotime “focuses on the changing expectations and events in the 
larger society, both within and across generations” (2006, p. 796). Integrating each of these 
aspects into the bioecological model, Bronfenbrenner and Morris defined human development as 
“the phenomenon of continuity and change in the biopsychological characteristics of human 
beings, both as individuals and as groups … over the life course, across successive generations, 
and through historical time, both past and future” (2006, p. 793). 
 
As Bronfenbrenner had already shown in his ecological theory, in the bioecological model the 
notion of stability and change occurs within a phenomenological perspective. Such a perspective 
considers not only the objective properties of the setting in which the person is acting and 
interacting but also the subjective properties, as experienced by the person (2001; 
Bronfenbrenner & Evans, 2000; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, 2006). 
 
Operationally, the bioecological model proposes methods for evaluating developmental 
outcomes that emerge as a result of the active participation of the four components of the PPCT 
model: process, person, context, and time. Bronfenbrenner also was convinced that the ideal 
method of study using his model was one of the “discovery” type, namely a method that includes 
all of the elements of the model, revealing their interdependence, given the available data, and 
that allows the elaboration of successive studies that are progressively more complex (1995a, 
2000, 2001; Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 1998, 2006). 
 
Discussion 
 
Bronfenbrenner's theory‐related publications from 1973 to 2006 reveal clearly the extent to 
which the theory evolved. The first phase was characterized by a description of ecological 
contexts, making clear the social nature of the process of human development. In this phase one 
can find the fullest description of the different levels of the ecological environment in which 
human beings develop. Human beings are described as not only the product but also the producer 
of their own development, but little explicit attention was paid to the role of the individual in this 
phase. 
 
The importance of the second phase is in Bronfenbrenner's discussion of the evolution of various 
research paradigms, with particular attention paid to the distinction between paradigms that 
either do or do not permit researchers an assessment of processes that might explain how 
development occurs. In this phase, Bronfenbrenner also made the first major modifications to the 
theory, in particularly paying more explicit attention to the role played by the person in 
development, to processes of development, to culture and subculture as important parts of the 
macrosystem, and to the chronosystem. 
 
The third phase constitutes the mature form of the theory, in which proximal processes are 
considered the primary driving force of development and the role of person characteristics is 
given far more weight as one of the two main factors (the other being the environment) that 
influence the functioning of proximal processes. Although Bronfenbrenner himself marked the 
beginning of the final version of the theory from 1998 (Bronfenbrenner & Evans, 2000), in fact, 
the change was first signaled in a paper coauthored with Ceci (1993), in which the authors for the 
first time referred to the theory as a bioecological theory, placed proximal processes as the 
driving force for development, and included the two central propositions describing proximal 
processes and how they are influenced. Although Bronfenbrenner and Morris's (1998) chapter 
included many more examples of research that supported the model, the only substantive change 
was to refer to the model with which the theory could be tested as a PPCT model (in 
Bronfenbrenner's 1994 paper he still referred to it as a PPC model and included time as the 
chronosystem, the temporal equivalent of the spatial context). 
 
In the earlier versions of the theory, Bronfenbrenner had represented the person, topologically, in 
the center of various circles, organized in levels from the most proximal to the most distal from 
the person, representing the various contexts (micro to macro) in which he or she was situated. 
That idea of enveloping circles, represented as the nested “matrioshka” (Russian dolls) continued 
to be used in the latest versions: “Today, as then, ‘the ecological environment is conceived as a 
set of nested structures, each inside the other like a set of Russian dolls’ (Bronfenbrenner, 1979b, 
p. 3)” (Bronfenbrenner & Morris, 2006, p. 814). In our opinion, however, this metaphor does not 
do adequate justice to Bronfenbrenner's position that each of the systems is interrelated. 
Moreover, the mesosystem is not a layer outside the microsystem but a relationship between or 
among microsystems. 
 
It is interesting to note that as Bronfenbrenner paid more attention to proximal processes and the 
ways in which they were influenced by both characteristics of the people involved in those 
processes and the contexts (microsystems) in which the processes occur, he largely ignored the 
macrosystem. Cultural and subcultural sets of values and practices, and the ways in which they 
influence processes of development, about which he had written at some length during the 
second phase of the theory's development, were left unmentioned in the third and final phase, 
even when citing at length Steinberg et al.'s (1995) research dealing with different ethnic groups 
in the United States. 
 
Nonetheless, despite the fact that Bronfenbrenner had paid more attention to the contexts in 
which development occurs during the first two phases, it is important to note that he never 
considered context as separate from the person, as should have been clear from his consistent use 
of the word ecology to signify the interplay between the environment and the individuals who are 
active within their environments. The change from ecology to bioecology in the theory's name 
was a result, no doubt, of a strategy to make yet more explicit the participation of the person in 
his or her own development. The fact that his colleague and subsequent collaborator had used the 
term in a book title (Ceci, 1990) also was a likely influence. 
 
Despite the fact that even during the first decade of this century many scholars continued to treat 
Bronfenbrenner's theory as one of contextual influences on human development (Tudge et 
al., 2009), it was always far more subtle, even from the start. Perhaps because the theory was so 
consistently referred to as a theory of context (usually with reference to the set of circles 
representing the levels of environment), Bronfenbrenner was forced to be clearer, in the second 
and third phases, about how person characteristics (in conjunction with the environment) 
influenced people's own development. 
 
It is easy to argue that persons and environments are mutually implicated in human development, 
but it is more difficult to explain how that functions. This issue clearly occupied 
Bronfenbrenner's thinking from the second phase onward. First, he introduced an adaptation of 
Lewin's formula—namely, that development is a function of the interaction between person and 
environment—and then tried to show, in different ways, how that function operated. Initially, he 
considered this in terms of process, making the argument that field‐theoretical studies (as 
opposed to class‐theoretical studies) included methods designed to show how one or more 
aspects of the environment, for example, actually influenced human development. In other 
words, Bronfenbrenner's notion of process, during the second phase, was as an explanatory 
mechanism. 
 
In the third and final phase he became far more explicit about the mechanism, now viewed as the 
engine or driving force of development and termed proximal processes. As he laid out in the first 
of the two crucial propositions relating to proximal processes, these are the types of everyday 
activities and interactions (with objects, symbols, and other persons) in which individuals are 
actively and consistently engaged. In the second proposition he argued that these proximal 
processes are mutually influenced by person characteristics and by the environment and, 
explicitly from 1998 onward, by what has happened and is currently happening in historical time. 
 
The growing attention to time is another clear change in the evolution of the theory. Despite the 
fact that Bronfenbrenner and Morris wrote, “The 1979 volume scarcely mentions the term [time] 
whereas in the current formulation, it has a prominent place” (1998, p. 995), Elder's (1974) work 
on the life course as affected by historical time had been covered extensively in the 1979 book, 
and the theory, from its inception, was a theory of human development, with a clear focus on 
continuity and change. Time, and timing, was therefore necessarily implicated. Nonetheless (and 
again no doubt because the theory was so consistently, and erroneously, viewed as a theory of 
context), Bronfenbrenner found it necessary, in the second and third phases of the theory's 
development, to call increasing attention to the role of time. 
 
The changes can be seen not simply in Bronfenbrenner's use of the term chronosystem (from 
1986 to 2006) to stress historical time, but even in the changes to Lewin's formula. Thus, in 1988 
the formula appeared simply as D = ∫(PE), but in 1989 it became Dt = ∫(t–p) (PE)(t–p), 
with t representing time at which an outcome is observed and t—p representing the period during 
which the person and environment were jointly operating to produce that developmental 
outcome. In effect nothing has been added to the formula except the explicit acknowledgment 
that processes of development involving an interplay of person and environment necessarily 
takes some degree of time. This formula no longer appears in the third phase of the theory's 
evolution, but time has become part of the PPCT model itself, and just as person characteristics 
were clearly distinguished in this phase, the impact of time was not only covered in terms of 
developmental outcomes but also broken apart into three (micro, exo, and macro time). 
 
As Tudge et al. (2009) pointed out, all theories undergo evolution. That is true whether one 
considers a theorist such as Vygotsky, who was actively involved in theory construction for little 
more than a dozen years, or for theorists such as Piaget or Bandura, who were theorizing for 
decades. The changes in Bronfenbrenner's theory are easier to see than most, because he often 
reflected on his own process of “re‐assessing, revising, and extending—and even renouncing—
some of the conceptions set forth in [the] 1979 monograph” (Bronfenbrenner, 1989, p. 187). A 
decade later he stated that “it is useful to distinguish two periods: the first ending with the 
publication of the Ecology of Human Development (Bronfenbrenner, 1979) and the second 
characterized by a series of papers that call the original model into question” (1999, p. 4). Thus 
there really is no reason for continuing to treat Bronfenbrenner's theory as one of contextual 
influences on development, or for ignoring the focus, during the third and final phase, on 
proximal processes and the use of the PPCT model as a guide for research using the 
bioecological theory. To the extent to which one goal of research is to test theory and support, 
modify, or discard it, a valid test can only be one that is actually based on the theory's main 
tenets. As we mentioned earlier, scholars may choose to base their research on an earlier version 
of the theory—but then they should be explicit about that. Otherwise theoretical incoherence will 
result from the label “Bronfenbrenner's theory” being used to describe versions that are quite 
different from one another. We hope that this article will contribute to a more effective use and 
testing of Bronfenbrenner's theory in its mature form, the fruit of an entire lifetime of theory 
development. 
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